Kristen Rundle
Forms Liberate
Reclaiming the Jurisprudence of Lon L Fuller
Hart Publishing, May 2012, 222 p., ISBN9781849461047, £40
Lon L Fuller's account of what he termed 'the internal morality of law' is widely accepted as the classic twentieth century statement of the principles of the rule of law. Much less accepted is his claim that a necessary connection between law and morality manifests in these principles, with the result that his jurisprudence largely continues to occupy a marginal place in the field of legal philosophy.
In 'Forms Liberate: Reclaiming the Jurisprudence of Lon L Fuller', Kristen Rundle offers a close textual analysis of Fuller's published writings and working papers to explain how his claims about the internal morality of law belong to a wider exploration of the ways in which the distinctive form of law introduces meaningful limits to lawgiving power through its connection to human agency. By reading Fuller on his own terms, 'Forms Liberate' demonstrates why his challenge to a purely instrumental conception of law remains salient for twenty-first century legal scholarship.
Auteure
Kristen Rundle is a Lecturer in Law at the London School of Economics.
Table of contents
1 Reclaiming Fuller 1
I Form and Agency 8
II What is Being ‘Reclaimed’? 11
III About the Book: Method, Material and Structure 17
IV Outline of the Chapters 20
2 Before the Debate 25
I The Early Fuller: Positivism and Natural Law at Mid-century 28
II Eunomics: A ‘Science or Theory of Good Order and Workable Social Arrangements’ 32
A Eunomics ‘Writ Large’ 37
B Eunomics ‘Writ Small’: The Models 39
III Navigating the Labels 45
IV Conclusion 48
3 The 1958 Debate 51
I Mapping the Debate 54
A Setting the Agenda: Hart’s Claims 54
B Reorienting the Agenda: Fuller’s Replies 58
(i) The Fidelity Frame 58
(ii) Diagnosing the Impasse 60
(iii) Moralities External and Internal 63
(iv) The Incompleteness of Positivism 65
II Reclaiming Fuller through the Nazi Law Debate 66
A Nazi Law according to Hart 66
B Nazi Law according to Fuller 68
C Analysis: Reading Fuller through the Nazi Law Debate 72
(i) Defending a Distinctive Natural Law Analysis 72
(ii) Positivism and Legal Pathology 73
(iii) The Turn to the Subject 75
(iv) Validity and Existence 76
III Fuller and Legal Validity 78
IV Conclusion 84
4 The Morality of Law 86
I Mapping The Morality of Law 88
A The Story of King Rex 88
B Situating Fuller’s Claims 92
C Conception of the Person Implicit in Legality 97
II Hart’s Review of The Morality of Law 102
A Mapping Hart’s Response 102
B Efficacy and Trusteeship 105
C Lessons from a Tyrant? 108
III A Different Path? 111
IV Conclusion 115
5 The Reply to Critics 118
I Mapping the ‘Reply to Critics’ 123
A ‘The Structure of Analytical Legal Positivism’ 124
B ‘Is Some Minimum Respect for the Principles of Legality Essential to the Existence of a Legal System?’ 125
C ‘Do the Principles of Legality Constitute an “Internal Morality of Law”?’ 126 Distinction between Law and Managerial Direction 127
D ‘Some Implications of the Debate’ 130
II Generality, Efficacy and Agency: Insights from the Archive 131
III Reflections on the ‘Reply to Critics’ 135
IV Conclusion 138
6 Resituating Fuller I: Raz 141
I Fuller and Raz 144
II Raz on the Rule of Law 148
III Raz on Authority 154
IV Conclusion: Form, Agency and Authority 159
7 Resituating Fuller II: Dworkin 161
I Fuller and Dworkin 161
II The 1965 Essays 163
III Dworkin’s Project 166
IV Fuller, Dworkin and Interpretation 168
V Fuller, Dworkin and Methodology 174
VI Fuller, Dworkin and the Value of Legality 177
A Content and Moral Significance of Generality 181
B Form and Concepts of Law 186
VII Conclusion: Taking Form Seriously 188
8 Three Conversations 190
I Morality 191
II Instrumentalism 193
III Legality 196
Fuller and Shapiro: A New Conversation? 198
IV Conclusion 203
Index 205
